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Abstract We exploit the exogenous shock of the COVID-19 pandemic on financial markets 
and regulatory restrictions on dark trading to investigate how volatility drives dark market share 
and trader venue selection. We find that, consistent with theory, excessive volatility on lit 
exchanges is linked with an economically significant loss of market share by dark pools to lit 
exchanges. The dynamics of market share loss are driven by the cross-migration of informed 
and uninformed traders between lit and dark venues. Informed traders migrate from lit venues 
to dark venues when lit venues’ volatility becomes excessive, while uninformed traders, wary 
of the presence of informed traders in dark pools, shift their trading to lit exchanges rather than 
delay trading in a volatile market environment. The market quality implications of the cross-
migration are mixed: while it improves liquidity on the lit exchange, it results in a loss of 
informational efficiency.  
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1. Introduction 
At the heart of the debate on the effects of trading in non-transparent downstairs-type 
markets – the so-called dark pools – are the dynamics of venue selection1 by both informed and 
uninformed traders. Theory suggests that dark trading dynamics are driven by volatility in the 
lit market (see Zhu, 2014); however, the endogenous determination of volatility makes it 
challenging to test this prediction. In this paper, we avoid this empirical issue by exploiting the 
novel coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis as an excess market volatility-inducing exogenous event 
to investigate the role of volatility in venue selection by informed and uninformed traders in 
today’s financial markets. Understanding the dynamics of venue selection is critical for the 
determination of the effects of dark trading on market quality characteristics, especially as the 
volume of trading activity credited to dark pools continues to reach new levels around the world. 
For example, the volume of trading executed in dark pools accounted for 9.1% and 9.6% of all 
on-exchange activity in April and July 2019, respectively. These are the largest shares in the 
MiFID II era, which already imposes an 8% cap on dark trading in European financial markets 
over any 12-month period.2 Furthermore, in the US, dark pools and other off-exchange trading 
venues executed 38.6% of US equity volume in April 2019.3  
Indeed, the less than adequate understanding of dark trading dynamics in an empirical 
sense may be driving the mixed evidence on the impact of dark trading on market quality 
characteristics. For example, Buti et al. (2011) find no supporting evidence that dark trading is 
harmful to market liquidity. Based on their analyses of FTSE data, Aquilina et al. (2017) and 
Brugler (2015) show that dark trading leads to improved liquidity in the aggregate and the 
primary exchange respectively. However, Nimalendran and Ray (2014) investigate trading data 
 
1 Reference to traders’ venue selection or choice implies their preference between dark and lit venues. 




from one of the 32 US dark venues and find that dark trading is associated with increased price 
impact on quoting exchanges. This is consistent with the findings of  Degryse et al. (2015); 
using data from the Dutch market, they show that dark trading has a detrimental effect on market 
liquidity. Adding complexity to the question is the increasingly popular view that the effects of 
dark trading on market quality characteristics are non-linear (see Comerton-Forde & Putniņš, 
2015; Aquilina et al., 2017).  
Zhu (2014) is increasingly recognised as one of the influential theoretical contributions 
on dark trading. Zhu’s (2014) model predicts a non-linear relationship between volatility and 
dark market share; specifically, for sufficiently small volatility, dark market share increases 
with volatility. However, for an excessive level of volatility, dark market share decreases with 
volatility. In the model, the addition of a dark pool to a market with a lit exchange results in an 
asymetric self selection involving informed and uninformed traders. Specifically, uninfomed 
traders gravitate towards the dark pool because they face lower adverse selection risk there, 
while infomed traders concentrate on the lit exchange due to the higher probability of non-
execution they face in the dark pool, since their orders typically bunch on one end of the limit 
order book. This self selection is linked to an improvement in informational efficiency in the 
aggregate market, comprising of the lit exchange and the dark pool (see Aquilina et al., 2017). 
If all informed traders hold similar types of information sets (for example, fundamental 
information about the value of an instrument) as modelled by Zhu (2014), the self-selection 
induced by dark trading can improve the efficiency of the price discovery process. This is 
because a reduction in the number of informed trades due to fewer uninformed traders in the lit 
market (informed orders execute against uninformed orders as in Glosten & Milgrom (1985), 
Kyle (1985) and many others) results in a lowering of competition on the same private 
information set held by informed traders. 
Zhu’s (2014) model establishes volatility as a key driver in the overall dynamics of self-
selection. As informed trader concentration increases in the lit market, volatility widens the 
exchange spread and encourages more uninformed (liquidity) traders to migrate to the dark pool 
– this is the natural state of things when volatility is moderate. Informed traders stay at the lit 
exchange because when volatility is at a moderate level, the exchange spread is not excessive, 
and thus the cost of execution risk is greater than the benefit of potential price improvements  a 
dark pool may offer (for example, in Australia and Canada, price improvement is required to 
trade regular sizes in dark pools).4 However, when volatility in the exchange exceeds the 
maximum level needed for informed traders to avoid the dark pool, informed traders start to 
migrate to the dark pool in search of uninformed counterparties to trade with and in a bid to 
avoid the widening exchange spread. Thus, liquidity constraints in the lit market can result in 
informed traders entering into non-transparent/dark venues in order to reduce their transaction 
costs and increase their profits, as already reported by some empirical studies (see Hendershott 
& Mendelson, 2000; Nimalendran & Ray, 2014). The informed traders’ migration consequently 
results in uninformed traders leaving the erstwhile safety of the dark pool for the lit exchange. 
Two studies have empirically examined the links between volatility and dark trading.5 
Buti et al. (2011) find that dark market share is higher on days with lower volatility, and Ye 
(2010) finds that stocks with lower volatility have higher dark market shares. Our study differs 
from Buti et al. (2011) and Ye (2010) for at least two reasons. Firstly, our motivation differs 
from the aforementioned studies. Specifically, Buti et al.’s (2011) motivation is investigating 
the effects of dark trading on market quality, and Ye (2010) aims to study transaction costs in 
crossing networks and the competition between exchanges and crossing networks. However, 
we focus on the role of volatility in traders’ venue choice in times of stress. As already 
 
4 See https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/issue-brief/policy-brief-trade-at-rules.ashx. 
5 At least one other study examines the effects of dark trading on volatility (see Foley et al. 2012) but not vice 
versa. 
discussed, an important motivation for addressing this question is offered by Zhu (2014). 
Specifically, Zhu (2014) shows that the relationship between volatility and venue choice is not 
linear, and while the impact of lit market volatility on dark market share is positive for 
sufficiently low levels of volatility, it becomes negative during excessive volatility/market 
stress periods. Secondly, the general endogenous determination of volatility makes it 
challenging to disentangle whether volatility informs the self-selection dynamics often reported 
in the finance media.6 Although Buti et al. (2011) and Ye (2010) employ an instrumental 
variable approach to address the question of the endogenous determination of volatility, further 
questions regarding the effectiveness of this approach remain.7 One issue is that the two studies 
only introduce instruments for dark market activity, since their focus is not the investigation of 
the effects of volatility on traders’ venue choice. Addressing this methodological challenge 
requires the identification of a truly exogenous volatility-inducing shock event. Hence, by 
contrast, we employ the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic impact on financial markets, which 
is clearly exogeneous and is not driven by any market determinants, for this purpose. The 
exogenous event we use in this study is driven by the spread of a virus that arguably has no 
comprehension of modern market structures nor directly responds to them.  
For clarity, we exploit both the excessive volatility-inducing COVID-19 pandemic, as 
a shock, and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) double volume cap 
(DVC) dark trading restrictions currently in force in the case of 55 European stocks, to 
investigate the role of volatility in the evolution of dark market share and the decision of where 
to trade in the cases of informed and uninformed traders. We find that, consistent with the 
theoretical literature (see Zhu 2014), excessive volatility at lit venues is linked with the 
 
6 See as examples, https://www.wsj.com/articles/dark-pools-draw-more-trading-amid-low-volatility-
11556886916 and https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/09/02/investors-flee-dark-pools-as-market-volatility-
erupts/ 
7 Buti et al. (2011) employ the method developed by Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) and use other stocks’ dark trading 
activity during the same time period as an instrument for dark trading activity in a particular stock. Ye (2010) uses 
the total trading volume as an instrument for total number of shares submitted to a crossing network.  
economically significant shift of informed trading activity from lit venues to dark pools. We 
also show that this move by informed traders drives the migration of uninformed traders, who 
are wary of being adversely selected, from dark pools to lit venues. The net effect of the cross-
migration is a loss of market share by dark pools and an increase in lit venues’ market share. 
We extend our analysis to examine the effects of these dynamics on market quality, and find 
that lit market liquidity improves (i.e. spreads narrow) during the volatile trading period, while 
price discovery deteriorates on account of informed traders migrating to the dark pools. Thus, 
it appears that volatility is a market regulating mechanism driving the share of trading activity 
in dark pools. Regulators should account for this when designing regulatory mechanisms, such 
as dark trading caps and waivers. 
 
2. Institutional background 
The enactment of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in November 
2007 introduced alternative high-tech trading venues known as multilateral trading platforms 
(MTFs). MTFs operate as intermediaries facilitating the exchange of financial instruments 
between a number of market participants. Concurrently, under MiFID, pre-trade and post-trade 
transparency requirements are imposed on all trading venues in order to reduce potential 
adverse selection costs linked to market fragmentation. However, MiFID also offers pre-trade 
transparency waivers to certain types of orders. These pre-trade transparency waivers include 
(1) reference price waivers (RPW); (2) negotiated trade waivers (NTW); (3) large in scale (LIS) 
and (4) order management facilities (OMF). RPW applies to trading systems that match trading 
at the midpoint current bid and ask price. NTW allows two parties to formalise negotiated 
transactions. LIS offers block traders the right to hide their trading intention when transaction 
size is larger than the prevailing normal market size. OMF allows orders to be held by 
exchanges in an order management facility pending disclosure. 
Since the commencement of MiFID, trades in dark pools operated by MTFs have 
benefited mainly from RPW and LIS. Pre-trade opacity and midpoint execution help fund 
managers to protect their trading intention and reduce transaction costs. However, European 
regulators, concerned by the potential negative influence of dark liquidity on the price discovery 
process, enacted a second iteration of MiFID, the so-called MiFID II, and the Market in 
Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR), published in June 2014. An important goal of 
MiFID II and MiFIR is to secure a high level of market transparency and fairness. As a result, 
DVC was introduced to curb dark trading and force more trades to be executed on lit venues. 
DVC dictates that the venue and aggregate market trading limits for each instrument are 4% 
and 8%, respectively. If the DVC is triggered in an instrument, then dark trading in that 
instrument will subsequently be suspended for 6 months. The DVC is calculated for each 
affected instrument on a daily rolling basis and relates to average daily trading volume over the 
preceding 12-month period. According to the first DVC-related data published in March 2018 
by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a total of 744 and 643 instruments 
breached at least one of the caps in January and February 2018 respectively, and were therefore 
subjected to six-month trading suspensions from 12th March 2018. As of September 2018, six 
months after the implementation of the DVC, more than 1200 instruments, mainly equities, 
were under dark trading suspensions. The affected instruments corresponded to about 35% of 
the most liquid European stocks. For our sample period, spanning 24th January and 24th March 
2020, ESMA data shows that 62 instruments’8 (55 out of which are European stocks) are under 
DVC dark trading suspensions; their suspensions are from 14th November 2019 until 13th May 
2020. 
It is worth noting that an enforcement of the DVC in a stock does not fully preclude 
some form of dark trading in the stock. Large block trades are still allowed to trade in dark 
 
8 https://www.esma.europa.eu/double-volume-cap-mechanism 
pools if the trade size is large enough to qualify for the LIS waiver. The LIS wavier threshold 
is based on the average daily volume (ADV) for each instrument. For small-cap stocks with 
ADV of less than €50,000, the LIS waiver threshold is €15,000 and for large-cap stocks with 
ADVs greater than €100 million, the LIS waiver threshold can be up to €650,000. In any case, 
market data shows that the dark trading volumes recorded once the DVC is enforced for a stock 
is zero to negligible. 
 
3. Sample selection and variables 
3.1. Sample Selection 
Investigating the role of volatility in venue choice is challenging because of the often-
endogenous determination of volatility by the venue selection decisions taken by both informed 
and uninformed traders. For example, uninformed traders deciding to migrate from lit to dark 
venues will induce volatility on the lit exchange; if the volatility level rises enough, it will force 
informed traders to move to dark venues in search of liquidity. In addition, it is also very likely 
that the venue choice process and volatility are determined by common factors, some of which 
cannot be observed directly. The above issues make identifying a volatility-inducing exogenous 
shock useful in being able to adequately estimate the impact of volatility on venue choice.  Such 
a shock should satisfy two important criteria: 1) it should have an impact on volatility and 2) it 
should not be determined by market conditions of dark pool trading. We argue that the market 
crisis induced by the spreading of COVID-19 is a potential candidate that satisfies these two 
criteria. Firstly, Baker et al. (2020) show that indeed stock market volatility in global markets 
increases significantly during this period. Secondly, it is obvious that the crisis caused by the 
pandemic has no direct connection to dark trading, or to any organised trading in financial 
markets for that matter – the virus is unaware of the existence of market structures. Motivated 
by this, we investigate the effects of stock price volatility on traders’ venue choice by employing 
COVID-19-induced volatility within a natural experimental difference-in-differences (DiD) 
framework. Our data covers a two-month period from 24th January to 24th March 2020, 
spanning the period prior to and the period defined by the market crisis occasioned by the rapid 
spreading of COVID-19. This is because Baker et al. (2020) show that the COVID-19-induced 
excessive volatility in global markets started on 24th February 2020, when the virus started to 
quickly spread in the US and Europe. 
Employing a DiD framework requires the identification of control and treated groups of 
stocks. Since we study the dynamics of venue choice between dark and lit venues, our treated 
group includes stocks that trade on both dark and lit venues. By contrast, the control group of 
stocks are restricted from trading on dark venues during our sample period; this is due to the 
imposition of a dark trading cap under the MiFID II provisions. This approach allows us to 
isolate the impact of COVID-19-induced volatility on trading activity in stocks eligible for dark 
trading from its market-wide effects, and is only possible because of the identification of stocks 
with dark trading restrictions. The implementation of the DVC creates a very good opportunity 
to identify our control group of stocks. Specifically, the stocks with suspended dark trading 
privileges during our sample are ideal candidates for the control group. Thus, we select the 55 
European equities serving dark trading suspensions between 14th November 2019 and 13th May 
2020, a period inclusive of our sample period (24th January to 24th March 2020).  
We use the method described in Shkilko and Sokolov (2020) to create a matched treated 
sample of stocks; hence, our total sample size equals 110 European stocks. Specifically, we 
compute the matching error for three metrics commonly used for this purpose: size, price and 
volume. Then, the 55 stocks with the corresponding lower matching errors for each of the 55 
stocks in the control group are included in the treated group. The method works well, because 
our key metrics do not differ economically and statistically between groups. 
 
3.2. Variable construction 
For every stock in the treated and control groups, we obtain intraday data from the 
Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) v2 database. We collect data from the main venues 
where our selected stocks are traded: 1) the main market where stocks are listed (for example, 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the UK stocks, Xetra for the German stocks, etc.); 2) Cboe 
Europe, which hosts the most liquid pan-European limit order books and dark pools, including 
BXE and CXE; and 3) Turquoise, hosting one of the most liquid dark pools in Europe, 
Turquoise Plato (formerly Turquoise Midpoint Dark). According to market data from Cboe 
Europe, the venues included in our dataset account for a daily minimum of 93% of the currency 
trading value for the stocks in our sample; hence, our data is representative in the cases of the 
stocks in the sample. The dataset contains standard transaction-level variables such as date, 
exchange time, transaction price, volume, bid price, ask price, bid size and ask size. Using the 
obtained dataset, we compute daily estimates of trading activity, liquidity, order imbalance, 
high-frequency trading (HFT) and volatility.  
As stated, the main aim of this study is to examine the dynamics of traders’ venue 
selection. We proxy venue choice by using dark market share and trading volume in lit markets, 
because they embody aggregate trader venue selection. The dark market share, !"#!,#, is 
computed as the dark trading volume divided by the total trading volume for stock i on day d. 
Trading volume,	%&'()*!,#, is the number of shares traded in lit venues for stock i on day d.9 
Within our framework, we aim to control for general market dynamics by including a number 
of relevant variables. We measure liquidity using relative quoted spread (+,-.*/0!,#) and depth 
(!*-1ℎ!,#). +,-.*/0!,# is the relative quoted spread for stock i on day d and is computed as a 
time-weighted average of the difference between ask and bid prices divided by the mid-price 
 
9 Throughout this paper, trading volume refers to trading volume in lit markets. Trading volume in dark markets 
is stated as dark trading volume.  
(mid-price is the average of ask and bid prices) corresponding to each transaction.  !*-1ℎ!,# is 
the top-of-book depth and computed as the natural logarithm of the sum of the best bid and ask 
sizes corresponding to each transaction for stock i on day d.  %&'/13'314!,# is a proxy for volatility and computed as the standard deviation of hourly 
mid-price returns for stock i on day d  (see Malceniece et al. 2019). 567!,# is the order imbalance 
metric described in Chordia et al. (2008) and is computed as the absolute value of the buyer-
initiated volume minus the number of seller-initiated volume divided by total volume stock i 
on day d. 89:!,# is the proxy for HFT and computed as the number of messages divided by the 
number of transactions for stock i on day d  (see Malceniece et al. 2019). Table 1 provides an 
overview of the different variables used in this paper. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the 110 stocks, i.e. 55 treated and 55 control 
stocks, in the sample. Panel A reports summary statistics for the pre-event period (from 24th 
January 2020 to 23rd February 2020), whereas Panel B presents summary statistics for the post-
event period (from 24th February 2020 to 24th March 2020). In both panels, we provide statistics 
for the treated and control groups of stocks separately and compute the statistical differences in 
our model variables in order to observe the differences in market dynamics for these groups; 
standard errors of the mean estimates are used for statistical inferences. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Panel A shows that the stock-day averages of all variables between the two stock groups, 
with the exception of !"#!,#,  in the treated group are not statistically different from each other. 
This underscores the relevance of our matching procedure and evidences that both groups have 
similar market dynamics prior to the COVID-19-induced market volatility event. There are 
some important points to note when comparing the evolution of variables during the post-event 
periods. Firstly, as evident in Panel B, the average values of all variables change substantially 
during the post-event period, which indicates that market conditions are different after the onset 
of the COVID-19-induced market volatility event. For example, the average %&'()*!,# 
increases by 2.5 (2.2) times for the treated (control) group. Moreover, +,-.*/0!,#  widens by 
more than 40% for both groups, indicating liquidity constraints. Secondly, while the average %&'()*!,# of the control group is marginally higher than the average %&'()*!,# of the treated 
group prior to the event, a substantial switch occurs following the onset of the excessive 
volatility period with the treated group’s average  %&'()*!,# suddenly outstripping the control 
group’s by 14%. This is consistent with our argument that excessive volatility contributes to 
the market dynamics of stocks traded simultaneously on both dark and lit venues. The observed 
16% decline in !"#!,# for the treated group of stocks suggests that some traders move to lit 
venues during excessive volatility periods. However, these traders could have also just exited 
the market altogether; we formally test this in the next section. Linked to the second point, 
thirdly, we also observe (in Panel B) statistically and economically significant differences in 
the estimated variables’ values for both groups of stocks during the excessively volatile sample 
interval, thus evidencing the significance of the impact of the COVID-19-induced excessive 
volatility/instability on stock characteristics.  
The findings presented in Table 2 raise an interesting question about why excessive 
market-wide volatility affects stocks differently depending on whether they are traded in a 
relatively unfettered manner in both dark and lit venues. We argue that this phenomenon is 
linked to dark venue trading availability. This is because when we compare the general market 
conditions (dark trading, liquidity, volatility, order-book dynamics and HFT activities) of the 
treated and control groups during the pre-event period, only !"#!,# differs significantly prior 
to the onset of excessively volatile trading conditions (see Panel A of Table 2). The significant 
(both economically and statistically) difference in !"#!,# is expected as the control group’s 
stocks have been suspended from dark trading, whereas the treated group’s stocks are available 
for trading in dark pools. This is further confirmed by the number of dark trading transactions 
in the treated and control groups during the sample period. Specifically, the treated group’s 
stocks have a total of 223,438 transactions in dark pools, while this number is 142 for the control 
group’s stocks. Thus, relatively unrestricted trading in dark venues appears as a strong indicator 
of the post-event differences between the control and treated groups’ market determinants. In 
the next section, we formally test our arguments driven from descriptive statistics analysis. 
 
4. Analyses, results and discussions 
4.1. Volatility analysis 
The main limitation of the existing empirical papers reporting on the volatility-dark 
trading relationship (see as an example, Buti et al. 2011) is that they ignore the non-linear 
relationship predicted by Zhu (2014) and, in their frameworks, volatility is endogenously-
determined. Excessive volatility and dark market share/venue choice are jointly endogenous as 
there may be a reverse causality between volatility and dark market share/venue choice. In order 
to address potential endogeneity concerns, we use the COVID-19-induced excessive volatility 
as an exogenous shock to investigate the relationship between excessive volatility and traders’ 
venue choice. Baker et al. (2020) show that from 24th February to 24th March 2020, US financial 
markets were dramatically volatile. More explicitly, the authors find that there are 18 market 
jumps in these 22 trading days and this number is the highest in financial markets history. This 
finding is strong evidence of the excessive market volatility extensively reported in the media 
during these periods. Although Baker et al.’s (2020) analysis is based on the US financial 
markets, and we focus on European markets, the volatility trend is consistent as shown in Figure 
1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1 shows the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on volatility in the 110 stocks in 
our sample. The volatility proxy is the average stock-day, %&'/13'314!,#, as defined in Section 
3.2 and Table 1. Consistent with Baker et al. (2020), there is a substantial increase in volatility 
from 24th February 2020. Specifically, %&'/13'314!,# increases by about 3 times between 24th 
February and 24th March 2020 in comparison with the month before. This implies that, like US 
markets, COVID-19 induces excessive volatility in European markets too. The COVID-19-
linked excessive volatility observed between 24th February and 24th March 2020 allows us to 
employ this pandemic as an exogenous shock to investigate the role of volatility in traders’ 
venue choice. 
   
4.2. Venue choice analysis 
4.2.1. Dark Market Share analysis 
 Zhu (2014) shows that excessive volatility increases (reduces) lit (dark) market share. 
We test this by first conducting a univariate analysis, followed by estimating a multivariate 
regression model. For the univariate analysis, we compute the evolution of dark market share 
during our sample period, and then test the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
dark pool share during the pre- and excessive volatility periods. It is important to note that this 
part of the analysis is strictly based on the treated group of stocks, because the control group of 
stocks are under dark trading suspension during the sample period. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 Figure 2 and Table 3 present the evolution of dark trading volume and dark market share 
during pre- and event periods. Although, dark trading volume in the treated stocks doubles 
during the excessive volatility period, this is only reflective of the overall increase in trading 
activity driven by the market response to the COVID-19 pandemic (see Figure 3 and Table 4). 
Indeed, dark market share declines from 2.5% to 2.1% (about 15.6% = (2.5-2.1)/2.5) which 
implies that the magnitude of the increase in trading activity is higher in the lit venue (the 
difference between pre-and the excessive market volatility periods is statistically significant at 
0.01 level for both dark volume and dark market share).  This is consistent with the predictions 
of Zhu (2014). Nevertheless, the insights are based on univariate analysis and should be backed 
up by a more robust analysis. Hence, we next conduct a multivariate analysis to further examine 
the trends described above. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
!"#!,# = <! + ># + 	?$@A*B1!,# + ?%%&'()*!,# +	?&+,-.*/0!,# 																													 													+	?'!*-1ℎ!,# +		?(%&'/13'314!,# +	?)567!,# + ?*89:!,# + 	C!,#                     (1) 
where @A*B1!,# is a dummy variable that equals one for the days between 24th February and 
24th March 2020 inclusive and zero otherwise. <! and ># are stock and time fixed effects. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.10 All other variables are as 
defined in Section 3.2 and Table 1. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the Equation (1). The estimates suggest a 
negative and statistically significant relationship (at 0.05 level) between @A*B1!,# and !"#!,#. 
Specifically, !"#!,# declines by 1.3% following the onset of the COVID-19-induced excess 
volatility in European markets. This implies that, consistent with Zhu (2014), dark market share 
decreases during periods of excessively high volatility. The result is consistent with the 
univariate analysis we present in Table 3 and shows that the relationship is still significant after 
controlling for important market dynamics/variables. The economic significance of the 
decrease as estimated with the multivariate analysis is even bigger than estimated with the 
univariate analysis. Explicitly, while in the univariate analysis we find a 15.6% (0.4/2.5) 
 
10 Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in all models estimated in the paper.  
reduction in dark market share, it is about 52% (1.3/2.5) in the multivariate analysis – 
effectively, more than half of the dark trading share of the market is lost during periods of 
market stress/volatility. Another important point to note is that, statistically, %&'/13'314!,# is not 
significantly related to !"#!,#. This is expected since @A*B1!,# captures excessive volatility in 
the stocks examined, and therefore the significance of %&'/13'314!,# disappears after controlling 
for @A*B1!,#  in the model. It implies that, consistent with Zhu (2014), excessive volatility is a 
more important factor than general volatility when explaining the impact of volatility on 
traders’ venue selection. This further underscores the distinction between this study and the 
existing literature on volatility and dark trading, which focuses only on endogenous general 
volatility (see Ye, 2010; Buti et al., 2011).  
The findings presented in Figure 2, Tables 3 and 4 allow us to speculate that, indeed, 
some fraction of dark market share moves to lit venues. However, this is not the only 
interpretation. Specifically, one may argue that dark traders delay their trading rather than 
moving to lit venues, and therefore the reduction in dark market share reported in Table 3 and 
4 is the result of this delay. We consider this argument by conducting some volume analysis in 
the next section. 
  
4.2.2. Volume Analysis 
The decrease in dark market share reported in Section 4.2.1 could potentially be 
explained by two mechanisms: 1) traders that use dark pools move to lit venues during periods 
of excessive volatility; and 2) these traders may delay their trading activity, in which case they 
are not migrating to lit venues. We employ a DiD framework in order to formally test which of 
these mechanisms explain our earlier finding.  
We demonstrate in Section 3.2 and Table 2 that the two groups of treated and control 
stocks we employ in this paper have very similar market dynamics prior to the onset of 
excessive market volatility driven by the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, both groups’ 
liquidity, volatility, order-book dynamics and HFT levels do not significantly differ from each 
before the event (see Table 2). The only identified difference between these groups is the 
availability of dark trading privileges for the treated group of stocks, with the control group of 
stocks restricted from dark trading due to their having breached the DVC under MiFID II 
provisions. Therefore, it is logical to expect that any difference between the impact of COVID-
19-induced volatility on treated and control groups’ market activities is linked to differences in 
dark trading privileges for both groups of stocks. In order to test whether this expectation holds, 
we estimate the following DiD model where the dependent variable is lit volume, %&'()*!,#: %&'()*!,# = <! + ># + 	?$@A*B1!,# + ?%:.*/1*0!,# +	?&@A*B1!,# ∗ :.*/1*0!,# 				+		?'+,-.*/0!,# 				+ 	?(!*-1ℎ!,# +		?)%&'/13'314!,# +	?*567!,# + ?+89:!,# + 	C!,#     (2) 
and where :.*/1*0!,# is a dummy equalling one for the treated group of stocks and zero for 
the stocks in the control group. <! and ># are stock and time fixed effects, and all other variables 
are as previously defined. @A*B1!,# ∗ 	:.*/1*0!,# is a key variable, encapsulating the difference 
between the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on treated and control groups. Specifically, if 
traders delay their trading in dark pools because of excessive volatility in lit markets, then the 
impact of COVID-19-sourced excessive volatility should be the same for both treated and 
control groups’ lit volume. This implies that the coefficient of @A*B1!,# ∗ 	:.*/1*0!,# would 
not be statistically significant, because dark market availability is the only difference between 
the control and treated groups’ market dynamics during the pre-event period (see Table 2) and 
that difference should disappear if traders that are using dark pools delay their trading. 
However, if traders that are active in dark pools before the event move to lit venues, then @A*B1!,# ∗ 	:.*/1*0!,# would be statistically significant because it captures the excess lit 
venues trading activity impact of traders with access to both lit and dark venues, and it could 
then be argued that they are shifting some of their trading from dark to lit venues.  
Before estimating the Equation (2), it is useful to conduct some univariate analysis 
aimed at guiding our thinking on what to expect from the multivariate analysis.  
INSERT FIGURE 3 AND TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 Panel A of Figure 3 presents the evolution of total trading volume, whereas Panel B 
presents the evolution of treated and control groups’ volume separately. It is important to note 
that this is the evolution of the day-by-day total volume for all stocks. As evident in Panel A, 
total daily trading volume increases during the post-event periods. This is not unusual as 
everyone is trading in an attempt to exploit information or hedge risks during excessive 
volatility periods. Panel B of Figure 3 offers us a more nuanced view of the impact of the 
COVID-19 crisis on the trading activity of investors with respect to the treated and control 
groups of stocks. Specifically, the control groups’ volume is slightly higher than the treated 
group’s volume before the event (the difference is not statistically significant). However, the 
situation changes drastically following the onset of the excessive volatility period and the 
treated group’s volume rises above the control group’s (see Table 5 for more details). Another 
important point to note in Panel B is the correlation between the evolution of the control and 
treated groups’ volume during the pre-event period. It is seen that %&'()*!,# for both groups 
have parallel trends in the absence of an event. It implies that the parallel trend assumption – 
which is vital for the empirical relevance of DiD framework – holds. Indeed, the break in the 
evolution of volume between the two groups is underscored by the differences in their level of 
volume increases after 24th February 2020. Table 5 shows that while the control group’s average 
daily lit volume increases by about 112% between 24th February and 24th March 2020, this 
increase is about 147% for the treated group, which indicates that the magnitude of increase is 
about 35% higher for the treated group. This is indeed a huge economic impact and consistent 
with our main argument regarding the move of traders from dark to lit venues. It is also 
consistent with estimates in Table 4 indicating significant falls in dark trading market share for 
our sample of stocks between 24th February and 24th March 2020.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 We now shift our attention to the outcome of the estimation of Equation (2) as reported 
in Table 6. There are some important points to note. Firstly, @A*B1!,# is statistically 
significantly (at 0.01 level) and positively related to %&'()*!,, implying that indeed there is a 
substantial increase in lit volume during the COVID-19-driven  market volatility period, when 
compared to the month before. Economically this implies that the number of shares traded daily 
during the post-event periods increases by about 1.2 million or, on average, 92% (= 1.2/1.3) for 
the 110 stocks in our sample.11 This is a significant economic effect and shows that the 
pandemic crisis has unmistakable impacts on financial markets. Secondly, and most 
importantly, the interaction coefficient (?&) suggests that COVID-19-induced volatility is 
linked with average daily increases of about 460,000 shares for each of the treated stocks when 
compared to the control group of stocks; the coefficient is statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
The economic significance of this relative increase in lit trading activity is obvious. The average %&'()*!,# for the control group of stocks is about 2 million shares during our sample period. 
Thus, the magnitude of increases in trading volume is about 23% (=0.46/2) higher for the treated 
group compared with the control group. This is indeed a substantial change in economic terms. 
Thus, there is compelling evidence that, although traders increase their lit venue trading activity 
for all stocks during the COVID-19-induced market volatility period, they do so on a larger 
scale for stocks with trading privileges in both lit and dark venues. Taken together with the 
estimates in Table 4 these estimates support the argument that, in times of excessive market 
volatility and widening lit market spreads, informed traders, who traditionally constitute a small 
proportion of traders, migrate to dark pools, and thus in turn induce the migration of uninformed 
 
11 The stock-day average trading volume during the pre-event period is 1.3 million shares (see Table 2).  
traders to lit venues as the latter seek to avoid being adversely selected by the former (see Zhu 
2014). Uninformed traders typically constitute the majority share of active market participants; 
therefore, the net effect of these dynamics is an increase in the lit trading activity of traders in 
the stocks eligible for trading in both lit and dark venues.  
  
4.3. How volatility drives venue choice by informed traders 
 Zhu (2014) identifies adverse selection risk as a key driver of the venue selection 
decisions made by traders, especially in the case of uninformed traders (see also Aquilina et al. 
2017). Specifically, the study suggests that informed traders stay on the lit exchange under 
“normal” market conditions, i.e. “normal” conditions means lower volatility and exchange 
spread. This is because under these conditions exchange spread is not excessive, and thus the 
cost of execution risk is higher than the price-improvements benefit. However, when there is 
excessive volatility in financial markets, then informed traders start to move to dark pools to 
avoid the higher exchange spread. This implies that excessive volatility in lit markets introduces 
additional adverse selection cost to dark pools. This “new” adverse selection cost forces 
uninformed\liquidity traders to exit from dark pools. In this scenario, dark pool liquidity traders 
have two options, either to delay their trading, which can be quite costly when markets are 
especially volatile as observed in this case, or move to lit exchanges.  The results reported in 
Table 6 show that traders select the second option and move to lit exchanges. In this section, 
we investigate whether the adverse selection channel proposed by Zhu (2014) explains our 
finding.  
 We proxy adverse selection cost by using the method developed by Lin et al. (1995).12 
Specifically, we compute the daily adverse selection component,	E#F!,#, of the relative spread, 
 
12 For robustness, we estimate the adverse selection component of the spread by using the approach of Stoll (1989) 
and obtain qualitatively similar results.   
+,-.*/0!,#, by using intraday high frequency data as obtained from the TRTH database. Then, 
as in Section 4.2, we compare the adverse selection costs of treated and control groups of stocks. 
When informed traders move to dark venues during excessive volatility periods, there is a 
difference between the evolution of E#F!,# (after controlling for the general trend in +,-.*/0!,#)  in the treated and control groups, as only the treated group’s stocks have an 
unfettered dark pool access option. This is linked to dark pools in Europe executing against the 
prices displayed by lit venues; they are, hence, essential passive price takers and are less 
informative than lit venues. As informed traders migrate to the dark pools, their ability to signal 
information will be curtailed given that midpoint dark pools execute with lit venues’ prices as 
references. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 AND TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 Panel A of Figure 4 presents the evolution of treated and control E#F!,# during the 
sample period. There are two essential points to note here. Firstly, E#F!,# increases for both 
groups, indicating that informed traders are more active during the post-event period. This is 
expected as +,-.*/0!,# increases for both groups too. Thus, an increase in E#F!,# is not very 
informative by itself. In order to investigate whether adverse selection cost increases or not, we 
need to compute the percentage of +,-.*/0!,# driven by adverse selection cost and compare 
its values for before and after the onset of the COVID-19-induced market volatility. For this, 
we divide E#F!,# by +,-.*/0!,# and then multiply the outcome by 100 to obtain the adverse 
selection component weighted by +,-.*/0!,#, 	E#G!,#. The estimates reported in Panel B of 
Table 7 show that, for the treated group, the average E#G!,# is 21% (=(13.14/61.14)*100) in 
the pre-event period, reducing to 19% (=(20.19/87.95)*100) during the COVID-19-induced 
market volatility period. For the control group, the average E#G!,# is 25% 
(=(15.69/61.39)*100) during the pre-event period, increasing to 37% (=(35.22/94.25)*100) 
during the COVID-19-induced market volatility period. Thus, while the control group’s adverse 
selection cost increases by 12%, the treated group’s adverse selection cost declines by about 
2%. This clearly shows that the COVID-19 crisis does not have the same impact on the adverse 
selection costs of treated and control groups. 
The above finding is further strengthened by the evolution of the difference between 
control and treated groups’E#F!,# , shown in Panel B of Figure 5. It is evident that the difference 
is relatively stable and close to 0 before the event. However, it increases and becomes more 
unstable after the event, which indicates both the reduction in proportion of information-driven 
trading activity in the treated stocks and the magnitude of the E#F!,# increases for the control 
group of stocks during the COVID-19-induced market volatility period. The difference is also 
found to be statistically significant when we use the standard error of the mean difference for 
statistical inference as shown in Panel A of Table 7. The estimates presented suggest that the 
difference between the control and treated groups’ E#F!,# prior to the COVID-19 crisis is 2.55 
bps and not statistically significant. However, the difference increases to 18.41 bps and becomes 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level following the onset of the crisis period. The same results 
hold for E#G!,# (see Panel B). This finding is consistent with Zhu (2014) and our argument that 
informed traders migrate to dark pools when volatility in lit venues becomes excessive. To 
formally test the argument in the multivariate framework, we estimate the following model; all 
variables are as previously defined: 
E#G!,# = <! + ># + 	?$@A*B1!,# + ?%:.*/1*0!,# +	?&@A*B1!,# ∗ 	:.*/1*0!,# 								+	?'!*-1ℎ!,# +		?(%&'/13'314!,# +	?)567!,# + ?*89:!,# + ?+%&'()*!,# + 	C!,#         (3) 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Table 8 reports the estimation results for Equation (3). @A*B1!,# is positive and statistically 
significantly (at 0.05 level), which implies that overall E#G!,# increases during the post-event 
period.13 However, the interaction coefficient (?&) is negative and statistically significant (at 
0.05 level) implying that the treated group’s E#G!,# reduces over the same period when we 
compare it with the control group’s E#G!,#. The magnitude of the association is also 
economically meaningful. Specifically, E#G!,# of the treated group reduces by 3.08% during 
the post-event period when we compare it with the control group. The economic significance 
of this estimate is put into some perspective when we consider that the stock-day average E#G!,# is about 29% for the control group in our sample period. The implication here is that 
information-based trading activity in stocks with dark trading privileges declines by about 10% 
(=3.08/29) during the most volatile period of the COVID-19-induced market turmoil in 
comparison with stocks without this privilege. This is consistent with the predictions of Zhu 
(2014) and the results presented in Figure 4 and Table 7 and suggests that indeed informed 
traders move their trading activity to dark pools during periods of excessive volatility. The 
move in turn drives the exit of uninformed traders from dark pools to lit venues, and this switch 
causes reductions in dark market share as reported in Table 4 and increases in lit market volume 
as shown in Table 6. One may argue that informed traders may stop trading, and therefore the 
reduction in E#G!,# of the treated group is related to this. However, if this is the case, we would 
expect to see the same effects in the control group; it is implausible that a different factor other 
than the opportunity to trade in an unfettered manner in dark pools is driving the differential in 
the evolution of E#G!,# during the COVID-19-induced market volatility period. Thus, our DiD 
framework allows as to interpret this result as informed traders moving from lit to dark venues.  
 
4.4. Market quality implications  
Empirical findings reported in Section 4.2 show that, overall, traders are shifting 
significant proportions of their trading from dark to lit venues during excessive volatility 
 
13 As reported in Table 7, this positive relationship is driven by the control group. 
(market stress) periods. More explicitly, we find that in times of excessive market volatility, 
informed traders migrate to dark pools in order to avoid the higher exchange spread, and this 
increases adverse selection risk in these markets. Thereafter, increased adverse selection forces 
uninformed traders to move from lit venues to dark ones (see Section 4.3). While reporting on 
these dynamics is of academic, and arguably practical, interest, the bottom-line should 
ultimately be what they mean for market quality. Therefore, in this section, we examine the 
market quality implications of this cross-migration.  
Price discovery and liquidity are generally considered to be two of the most important 
market quality characteristics (see O'Hara 2003). Hence, we examine the effects of the reported 
dynamics on both the efficiency of the price discovery process/informational efficiency and 
liquidity by using a DiD framework similar to those used in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 above. We 
estimate the following models with market quality metrics on the left-hand side.  
+,-*/0!,# = <! + ># + 	?$@A*B1!,# + ?%:.*/1*0!,# +	?&@A*B1!,# ∗ 	:.*/1*0!,# 								+	?'!*-1ℎ!,# +		?(%&'/13'314!,# +	?)567!,# + ?*89:!,# + ?+%&'()*!,# + 	C!,#         (4) F&..!,# = <! + ># + 	?$@A*B1!,# + ?%:.*/1*0!,# +	?&@A*B1!,# ∗ 	:.*/1*0!,# +														?'+,-.*/0!,# +	?(!*-1ℎ!,# +		?)%&'/13'314!,# +	?*567!,# + ?+89:!,# +																																																																																																																							?-%&'()*!,# + 	C!,# 	        (5)                                                                                                                                          
where the proxy for informational efficiency, F&..!,#, is the absolute value of first order return 
autocorrelation for each stock i on day d, expressed in basis points (bps). It is computed by first 
estimating 30 seconds’ returns within each stock-day (.*1!,,,#) and then computing F&..!,# as F&..!,# =	 HF&..*'/13&B(.*1!,,,# , .*1!,,.$,#)H. We employ the absolute value of the correlation 
coefficients as this captures both the under- and over-reaction of returns to information, with 
smaller values indicating greater efficiency. The empirical relevance of this metric is 
underscored by its wide use in the literature (see as examples, Hendershott & Jones, 2005; 
Comerton-Forde & Putniņš, 2015). All other variables are as previously defined. The first 
model, Equation (4), is used to estimate the impact of the dark trading dynamics in the treated 
stocks during the volatile period on lit market liquidity, with relative spread as the proxy for 
liquidity, whereas the second model, Equation (5), examines the role of the dark trading 
dynamics in the treated stocks during the volatile period in price discovery. 
INSERT TABLES 9 AND 10 ABOUT HERE 
 Table 9 reports estimation results for the Equation (4). The interaction variable’s 
coefficient, ?&, is negative and statistically significant (at 0.05 level) implying that the treated 
group’s  +,-*/0!,# decreases during the excessive volatility periods when compared to the 
control group’s  +,-*/0!,#. +,-*/0!,# is the inverse measure of liquidity, which means that 
the treated group’s liquidity improves over the same period in comparison with the control 
group’s liquidity. This is consistent with earlier reported estimates in this paper, as well as the 
predictions of Zhu (2014), supporting the notion that the migration of informed traders’ to dark 
pools unleashes an exodus of uninformed (liquidity) traders from dark pools to lit venues. This 
ultimately results in lit venues increasing their share of liquidity-providing traders and executed 
orders. The magnitude of the narrowing observed in the treated stocks’ +,-*/0!,# during the 
COVID-19 impact period is also economically meaningful. Specifically, the spread of stocks 
with dark trading privileges narrows by about 9% (=7.25/81) during the post-event period when 
compared with the control group.14 
 Table 10 shows the estimated coefficients for Equation (5). The interaction variable, @A*B1!,# ∗ 	:.*/1*0!,#, is positively related to F&..!,#; the relationship is statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level. The first observation here is that the informational efficiency 
impact of dark trading is not as powerful as its liquidity effects. The asymmetric effects of dark 
 
14 The average !"#$%&!,# for the control group is 81 bps. 
trading dynamics on market quality characteristics is in line with the literature. For example, 
Zhu (2014) shows that the addition of a dark pool to a lit exchange decreases liquidity on the 
lit exchange and improves price discovery (see also Buti et al., 2011; Comerton-Forde & 
Putniņš, 2015). Nevertheless, the significance of the informational efficiency effects is obvious, 
with the implication that the treated group’s informational efficiency deteriorates in response 
to the volatile trading conditions spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic, when compared to the 
control group’s informational efficiency. The change in informational efficiency is also 
economically meaningful. The average F&..!,# for the control group is 1082 bps, which 
suggests that the treated group’s information efficiency deteriorates by about 2.8% 
(=31.34/1082) as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic market turmoil, in comparison with that 
of the control group. This finding is not surprising and is what we would expect to find given 
the migration of informed traders to dark pools as a result of increased volatility on the lit 
exchange. Estimates in Table 8 show that, consistent with the theoretical literature (see Zhu, 
2014), informed traders migrate from the lit to dark venues during the COVID-19-induced 
excessive market volatility period. The consequence of this is a delay in the incorporation of 
information held by the migrating informed traders, since dark pools do now offer pre-trade 
transparency. Under normal conditions, when trading in a lit venue via the limit order book, 
information held by informed traders is more likely to be observed earlier than when they trade 
in dark pools, where they are also more susceptible to non-execution risk. Ultimately, although 
the (negative) informational efficiency effect of the COVID-19-triggered dark trading 
dynamics is economically meaningful, it pales in comparison to the liquidity effects. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The most obvious impact of the 2019-20 COVID-19 pandemic on financial markets is 
the injection of an unprecedented level of price volatility, especially in the cases of developed 
markets in the US and Europe. In February 2020, the pandemic-driven volatility held European 
markets in its vice-like grip for weeks, and in the process has induced a series of interesting 
market dynamics. One of these dynamics is a sharp loss of market share by dark pools as widely 
reported in the financial media.15 In this paper, we exploit the exogenous nature of the volatility 
induced by the pandemic and the existing dark trading caps policy in force in European markets 
as part of MiFID II provisions to investigate how volatility drives dark market share and the 
dynamics of venue selection by informed and uninformed traders. 
Through a series of univariate and multivariate analyses we show that, in line with the 
theoretical literature (see Zhu 2014), excessive volatility at lit venues is linked with the 
migration of informed traders from those venues to dark pools, which in turn drives the 
migration of adverse selection-wary uninformed traders from dark pools to lit venues. The net 
effect of the cross-migration is a loss of market share by dark pools and an increase in lit venues’ 
market share. The market quality implications of these dynamics, although mixed, are 
economically meaningful and statistically significant. While stocks with dark trading privileges 
experience higher levels of liquidity, i.e. narrower spreads, during the COVID-19-driven 
market volatility period, the informational efficiency of their prices reduces in comparison to 
the stocks under dark trading restrictions. 
This contribution is timely and has implications for dark trading regulation, given the 
increasingly intense regulatory constraints being considered for the use of dark pools across the 
world, and already implemented in Europe. Seemingly appealing and uncomplicated policies 
aimed at addressing the complex issues in financial markets, such as algorithmic trading, market 
fragmentation and dark trading, are often inadequate, mainly because they are seldom driven 
by a full understanding of the factors driving such phenomena. With respect to dark trading, 
what our results show is the need for regulatory interventions to be flexible and account for 
 
15 See as an example the coverage by Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/11c4b4d8-ff8a-49d3-817b-
09de8266479a 
changes in market conditions, such as periods of exogenously driven high volatility. This is 
because provisions designed for normal trading conditions (e.g. dark trading caps and waivers) 
become irrelevant when markets are impacted by events such as a pandemic. 
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Figure 1. Volatility 
The figure plots the day-by-day evolution of the cross-sectional average of  !"#$%&#&%'!,# for 110 European stocks employed in the study. !"#$%&#&%'!,# is 
computed as the standard deviation of hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d. The sample period covers from 24th January to 24th March 2020. The vertical 






































































































































Figure 2. Dark trading 
The figure plots the day-by-day evolution of the dark volume and dark market share for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues. 
Dark market share is computed as the dark trading volume for a given day divided by the total trading volume on the same day. The sample period covers from 
24th January to 24th March 2020. The vertical bar indicates 24th February 2020, when the COVID-19-induced excessive volatility is adjudged to have commenced 






























































































































































































Event Dark Volume Dark Share
Figure 3. Trading volume 
The figure presents the day-by-day evolution of lit volume	for 110 European stocks; Panel A presents the day-by-day evolution of lit volume for the full sample 
(both the 55 stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and the 55 stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks), while 
Panel B shows the day-by-day evolution of lit volume for the control and treated groups separately. The sample period covers from 24th January to 24th March 

















































































































































































































































































Event Control Volume Treated Volume
Figure 4. Adverse selection component 
Panel A presents the day-by-day evolution of the cross-sectional average of )*+!,# for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. 
treated stocks, and for 55 European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks. Panel B shows the evolution of the difference between the control 
group’s )*+!,# and the treated group’s )*+!,#. )*+!,# is the adverse selection component of relative spread ,-./0$1!,# for stock i on day d and is computed by 
using the method developed by Lin et al. (1995).  The sample period covers from 24th January to 24th March 2020. The vertical bar indicates 24th February 2020, 























































































































































































































































































Table 1. Variable definitions 
This table defines the variables used in this study. Unit is the unit of measurement; Market is the market 
for which a variable is computed; and Definition provides a short definition and computation method.  
 
Variable Unit Market Definition !"#!,# % Dark, Lit Dark market share; computed as dark trading volume divided 
by the total trading volume for stock i on day d $%&'()!,# Millions Lit Number of shares traded in stock i on day d *+,-)./!,# bps Lit Relative quoted spread for stock i on day d; computed as a 
time-weighted average of the difference between ask and bid 
prices divided by the mid-price (mid-price is the average of 
ask and bid prices) corresponding to each transaction 
!),0ℎ!,# ln Lit The top-of-book depth; computed as the natural logarithm of 
the sum of the best bid and ask sizes for stock i on day d. 
$%&.02&203!,#  Lit A proxy for volatility; computed as a standard deviation of 
hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d 456!,#  Lit Order imbalance defined in Chordia et al. (2008); computed 
as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume minus the 
number of seller-initiated volume divided by total volume 
stock i on day d 789!,#  Lit A proxy for HFT and computed as the number of messages 







Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
This table contains the pre- (Panel A) and event (Panel B) periods stock-day mean and standard 
deviation estimates for variables using data for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and 
dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control 
stocks. The final column presents the t-statistics of two-sample t-tests of differences between the treated 
group’s and the control group’s variables. !"#!,# is the dark market share and is computed as the dark 
trading volume divided by the total trading volume for stock i on day d, $%&'()!,# is the number of 
shares traded for stock i on day d, *+,-)./!,# is the relative quoted spread for stock i on day d and is 
computed as a time-weighted average of the difference between ask and bid prices divided by the mid-
price (mid-price is the average of ask and bid prices) corresponding to each transaction, !),0ℎ!,# is the 
top-of-book depth and is computed as the natural logarithm of the sum of the best bid and ask sizes for 
stock i on day d, $%&.02&203!,# is a proxy for volatility and is computed as the standard deviation of 
hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d, 456!,# is the order imbalance for stock i on day d and is 
computed as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume minus the number of seller-initiated 
volume divided by the total volume of stock i on day d, 789!,# is a proxy for HFT and is computed as 
the number of messages divided by the number of transactions for stock i on day d. The sample period 
is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. The event start date is 24th February 2020, when the COVID-
19-induced excessive volatility is adjudged to have commenced in global financial markets. *, ** and 
*** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.  
Panel A. Pre-event period 
Variable Treated group Control group Difference between means (t-
statistic) 
 Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Treated - control !"#!,# 2.5% 0.023 0.009% 0.001 2.45%*** (37.69) $%&'()!,# 1.328 0.261 1.332 0.109 -0.004 (-0.491) *+,-)./!,# 61.142 7.813 61.386 5.231 -0.244 (-0.902) !),0ℎ!,# 13.778 1.305 13.724 0.464 0.054 (1.356) $%&.02&203!,# 0.0151 0.002 0.0152 0.001 -0.0001 (-1.551) 456!,# 0.321 0.091 0.325 0.013 -0.004 (-1.513) 789!,# 17.704 6.752 17.931 2.315 -0.227 (-1.106) 
 
Panel B. Event period 
Variable Treated group Control group Difference between means (t-
statistic) 
 Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Treated - Control !"#!,# 2.1% 0.029 0.009% 0.002 2.095%*** (25.071) $%&'()!,# 3.275 4.115 2.874 2.631 0.401*** (2.855) *+,-)./!,# 87.952 11.146 94.253 7.705 -6.301*** (-16.176) 
!),0ℎ!,# 14.840 1.331 14.394 0.493 0.446*** (10.930) $%&.02&203!,# 0.0338 0.004 0.0418 0.002 -0.008*** (-62.225) 456!,# 0.337 0.107 0.394 0.022 -0.057*** (-18.151) 789!,# 19.979 5.721 18.493 2.317 1.486*** (8.374) 
 
Table 3. Dark volume 
This table presents average daily dark trading volume and dark market share for the treated group during 
pre- and event periods along with t-statistics of the two-sample t-tests of differences between pre- and 
event periods’ dark volume statistics. The sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. The 
event start date is 24th February 2020, when the COVID-19-induced excessive volatility is adjudged to 
have commenced in global financial markets. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 Dark volume (mln) Dark market share (%) 
Pre-event period 1,77 
 
2.5 
 Event period 3.57 
 
2.1 
 Difference (Event – pre) 1.80 
 
-0.4 




Table 4. The role of COVID-19 induced excessive volatility in dark market share 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model: 
 !"#!,# = ;! + =# + 	?$@A)B0!,# + ?%$%&'()!,# +	?&*+,-)./!,# +	?'!),0ℎ!,# 																														 																																																																																													+		?($%&.02&203!,# +	 	?)456!,# + ?*789!,# + 	C!,# 
where !"#!,# is a dark market share and is computed as the dark trading volume divided by the total 
trading volume for stock i on day d, ;! and =# are stock and time fixed effects respectively, @A)B0!,# 
is a dummy equalling 1 from 24th February to 24th March 2020 and 0 from 24th January to 23rd February 
2020. $%&'()!,# is the number of shares traded for stock i on day d, *+,-)./!,# is the relative quoted 
spread for stock i on day d and is computed as a time-weighted average of the difference between ask 
and bid prices divided by the mid-price (mid-price is the average of ask and bid prices) corresponding 
to each transaction, !),0ℎ!,# is the top-of-book depth and is computed as the natural logarithm of the 
sum of the best bid and ask sizes for stock i on day d, $%&.02&203!,# is a proxy for volatility and is 
computed as the standard deviation of hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d, 456!,# is the order 
imbalance for stock i on day d and is computed as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume 
minus the number of seller-initiated volume divided by the total volume of stock i on day d, 789!,# is 
a proxy for HFT and is computed as the number of messages divided by the number of transactions for 
stock i on day d. The sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. The sample includes 55 
European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and 55 European 
stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic @A)B0!,+ -1.3** -2.54 *+,-)./!,+ -0.0008** -2.21 !),0ℎ!,+ 1.02*** 19.14 $%&.02&203!,+ -0.0 -0.46 456!,+ 0.07*** 3.08 789!,+ 0. 01*** 3.14 
Stock fixed effects Yes  
Time fixed effects Yes  *%DDDD 56.2 %  
 
Table 5. Trading volume 
This table contains the pre- and event average daily volume estimates for 55 European stocks that could 
be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 European stocks with dark venue 
restrictions, i.e. control stocks. The estimates are reported separately for the treated and control groups 
along with t-statistics of the two-sample t-tests of differences between pre- and event periods average 
daily volumes. The sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. The event start date is 24th 
February 2020, when the COVID-19-induced excessive volatility is adjudged to have commenced in 
global financial markets. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels respectively. 
 
 Control group (mln) Treated group (mln) 
Pre-event period 73.04 
 
69.96 
 Event period 155.15 
 
161.52 
 Difference (event – pre) 82.11 
 
91.56 




Table 6. The role of COVID-19 induced excessive volatility in lit volume 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model, estimated using data 
for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 
European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks: 
 $%&'()!,# = ;! + =# + 	?$@A)B0!,# + ?%9-).0)/!,# +	?&@A)B0!,# ∗ 	9-).0)/!,# + 	?'*+,-)./!,# 																																																																		+	?(!),0ℎ!,# +		?)$%&.02&203!,# +	 	?*456!,# + ?,789!,# + 	C!,# 
where $%&'()!,# is the number of shares traded for stock i on day d, ;! and =# are stock and time fixed 
effects respectively, @A)B0!,# is a dummy equalling 1 from 24th February to 24th March 2020 and 0 
from 24th January to 23rd February 2020. 9-).0)/!,# is a dummy, which equals 1 for the treated group 
of stocks and 0 for the control group of stocks.  *+,-)./!,# is the relative quoted spread for stock i on 
day d and is computed as a time-weighted average of the difference between ask and bid prices divided 
by the mid-price (mid-price is the average of ask and bid prices) corresponding to each transaction, !),0ℎ!,# is the top-of-book depth and is computed as the natural logarithm of the sum of the best bid 
and ask sizes for stock i on day d, $%&.02&203!,# is a proxy for volatility and is computed as the standard 
deviation of hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d, 456!,# is the order imbalance for stock i on 
day d and is computed as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume minus the number of seller-
initiated volume divided by the total volume of stock i on day d, 789!,# is a proxy for HFT and is 
computed as the number of messages divided by the number of transactions for stock i on day d. The 
sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic @A)B0!,+ 1.22*** 2.65 9-).0)/!,+ -0.15 -1.5 @A)B0!,+ ∗ 	9-).0)/!,+ 0.460** 2.37 *+,-)./!,+ -0.005*** -4.72 !),0ℎ!,+ 0.93*** 10.85 $%&.02&203!,+ 10.49*** 6.34 456!,+ 1.09*** 4.33 789!,+ 0.0004 0.24 
Stock fixed effects YES  
Time fixed effects YES  *%DDDD 67.5%  
 
Table 7. Adverse selection component 
This table contains the pre- and event stock-day averages of F#G!,# and F#H!,#, for 55 European stocks 
that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 European stocks with dark 
venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks. The estimates are reported separately for the treated and control 
groups along with t-statistics of the two-sample t-tests of differences between treated and control 
groups. F#G!,# is the adverse selection component of *+,-)./!,# and is computed using the method 
developed by Lin et al. (1995), while F#H!,# is the weight of  F#G!,# in *+,-)./!,#, calculated by 
dividing F#G!,# by *+,-)./!,# and then multiplying by 100. The sample period is from 24th January to 
24th March 2020. The event date is 24th February 2020, when the COVID-19-induced excessive 
volatility is adjudged to have commenced in global financial markets. *, ** and *** correspond to 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Pre-event Event 
Treated F#G!,# 13.14 
 
16.81 
 Control F#G!,# 15.69 
 
35.22 
 Difference (control – treated) 2.55 (1.61) 18.41***(3.63) 
  
Panel B 
 Pre-event Event 
Treated F#H!,# 21% 
 
19% 
 Control F#H!,# 25% 
 
37% 
 Difference (control – treated) 4% (1.58) 18%***(5.75) 
  
Table 8. The role of COVID-19 induced excessive volatility in adverse selection cost 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model, estimated using data 
for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 
European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks: F#H!,# = ;! + =# + 	?$@A)B0!,# + ?%9-).0)/!,# +	?&@A)B0!,# ∗ 	9-).0)/!,# 																																					+	?'!),0ℎ!,# +		?($%&.02&203!,# +	 	?)456!,# + ?*789!,# + ?,$%&'()!,# + 	C!,# 
where F#H!,# is the weight of  F#G!,# in *+,-)./!,#, calculated by dividing F#G!,# by *+,-)./!,# and 
then multiplying by 100, F#G!,# is the adverse selection component of *+,-)./!,# and is computed by 
using the method developed in Lin et al. (1995), *+,-)./!,# is the relative quoted spread for stock i on 
day d and is computed as time-weighted average of the difference between ask and bid prices divided 
by the mid-price (mid-price is the average of ask and bid prices) corresponding to each transaction. ;! 
and =# are stock and time fixed effects respectively, @A)B0!,# is a dummy equal 1 from 24th February 
to 24th March 2020 and 0 from 24th January to 23rd February 2020, 9-).0)/!,# is a dummy equalling 1 
for the treated group of stocks and 0 for the control group of stocks. !),0ℎ!,# is the top-of-book depth 
and is computed as the natural logarithm of the sum of the best bid and ask sizes for stock i on day d, $%&.02&203!,# is a proxy for volatility and is computed as the standard deviation of hourly mid-price 
returns for stock i on day d, 456!,# is the order imbalance for stock i on day d and is computed as the 
absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume minus the number of seller-initiated volume divided by the 
total volume of stock i on day d, 789!,# is a proxy for HFT and is computed as the number of messages 
divided by the number of transactions for stock i on day d. The sample period is from 24th January to 
24th March 2020. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** 
correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic @A)B0!,+ 2.23** 2.17 9-).0)/!,+ -1.59 -1.40 @A)B0!,+ ∗ 	9-).0)/!,+ -3.08** -2.03 !),0ℎ!,+ -0.91*** -3.85 $%&.02&203!,+ 3.53* 1.71 456!,+ 3.85*** 5.53 789!,+ 0.306 0.66 $%&'()!,+ 0.54 1.35 
Stock fixed effects YES  





Table 9. The role of COVID-19 induced excessive volatility in liquidity 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model, estimated using data 
for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 
European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks: *+,-)./!,# = ;! + =# + 	?$@A)B0!,# + ?%9-).0)/!,# +	?&@A)B0!,# ∗ 	9-).0)/!,# 																																					+	?'!),0ℎ!,# +		?($%&.02&203!,# +	 	?)456!,# + ?*789!,# + ?,$%&'()!,# + 	C!,# 
where *+,-)./!,# is the relative quoted spread for stock i on day d and computed as time-weighted 
average of the difference between ask and bid prices divided by the mid-price (mid-price is the average 
of ask and bid prices) corresponding to each transaction. ;! and =# are stock and time fixed effects 
respectively, @A)B0!,# is a dummy equal 1 from 24th February to 24th March 2020 and 0 from 24 January 
to 23 February 2020, 9-).0)/!,# is a dummy equalling 1 for the treated group of stocks and 0 for the 
control group of stocks. !),0ℎ!,# is the top-of-book depth and is computed as the natural logarithm of 
the sum of the best bid and ask sizes for stock i on day d, $%&.02&203!,# is a proxy for volatility and is 
computed as the standard deviation of hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d, 456!,# is the order 
imbalance for stock i on day d and is computed as the absolute value of the buyer-initiated volume 
minus the number of seller-initiated volume divided by the total volume of stock i on day d, 789!,# is 
a proxy for HFT and is computed as the number of messages divided by the number of transactions for 
stock i on day d. The sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. Standard errors are robust 
to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic @A)B0!,+ 21.88*** 3.21 9-).0)/!,+ -1.14 -0.53 @A)B0!,+ ∗ 	9-).0)/!,+ -7.25** -2.54 !),0ℎ!,+ -6.92*** -5.41 $%&.02&203!,+ 15.72*** 6.46 456!,+ 4.54* 1.72 789!,+ 0.04 1.59 $%&'()!,+ -1.03*** -4.60 
Stock fixed effects YES  








Table 10. The role of COVID-19 induced excessive volatility in price discovery/informational 
efficiency 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression model, estimated using data 
for 55 European stocks that could be traded at both lit and dark venues, i.e. treated stocks, and for 55 
European stocks with dark venue restrictions, i.e. control stocks: G%--!,# = ;! + =# + 	?$@A)B0!,# + ?%9-).0)/!,# +	?&@A)B0!,# ∗ 	9-).0)/!,# + ?'*+,-)./!,# 		 																																					+	?(!),0ℎ!,# +		?)$%&.02&203!,# +	 	?*456!,# + ?,789!,# + ?-$%&'()!,# + 	C!,# 
where G%--!,# is first-order return autocorrelations for each stock i on day d at 30 seconds frequency. ;! and =# are stock and time fixed effects respectively, @A)B0!,# is a dummy equalling1 from 24th 
February to 24th March 2020 and 0 from 24th January to 23rd February 2020, 9-).0)/!,# is a dummy 
equalling 1 for the treated group of stocks and 0 for the control group of stocks. *+,-)./!,# is the 
relative quoted spread for stock i on day d and computed as time-weighted average of the difference 
between ask and bid prices divided by the mid-price (mid-price is the average of ask and bid prices) 
corresponding to each transaction. !),0ℎ!,# is the top-of-book depth and is computed as the natural 
logarithm of the sum of the best bid and ask sizes for stock i on day d, $%&.02&203!,# is a proxy for 
volatility and is computed as the standard deviation of hourly mid-price returns for stock i on day d, 456!,# is the order imbalance for stock i on day d and is computed as the absolute value of the buyer-
initiated volume minus the number of seller-initiated volume divided by the total volume of stock i on 
day d, 789!,# is a proxy for HFT and is computed as the number of messages divided by the number of 
transactions for stock i on day d. The sample period is from 24th January to 24th March 2020. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic @A)B0!,+ 60.41 0.36 9-).0)/!,+ -3.33 -0.47 @A)B0!,+ ∗ 	9-).0)/!,+ 31.34* 1.71 *+,-)./!,+ -2.06*** -7.19 !),0ℎ!,+ -5.41*** -13.39 $%&.02&203!,+ -26.41*** -3.88 456!,+ -4.39*** -3.94 789!,+ -0.26 -0.64 $%&'()!,+ 1.98 0.41 
Stock fixed effects YES  
Time fixed effects YES  *%DDDD 24.1%  
 
Appendix A 
This appendix lists the stocks included in the stock sample. The stocks are listed alphabetically using 
the ISINs. 
 
ISIN Company Name Country 
BE0003755692 Agfa-Gevaert Nv Belgium 
BMG671801022 Odfjell Drilling Ltd. Norway 
CH0001341608 Hypothekarbank Lenzburg Ag Switzerland 
CH0003390066 Mikron Holding Ag Switzerland 
CH0010754924 Schweiter Technologies Ag Switzerland 
CH0239518779 Hiag Immobilien Holding Ag Switzerland 
CH0386200239 Medartis Holding Ag Switzerland 
CH0406705126 Sensirion Holding Ag  Switzerland 
DE0006219934 Jungheinrich Ag Germany 
DE0006569908 Mlp Ag Germany 
DE000A1DAHH0 Brenntag AG Germany 
DK0016188733 Nykredit Invest Balance Defensiv Denmark 
DK0016188816 Nykredit Invest Balance Moderat Denmark 
DK0060010841 Danske Inv Mix Akk Kl Denmark 
DK0060642726 Maj Invest Value Aktier Akkumulerende Denmark 
DK0060738599 Demant Denmark 
ES0171996095 Grifols, S.A. Spain 
FI0009003727 Wärtsilä Oyj Abp Finland 
FI0009010854 Lassila & Tikanoja Oyj Finland 
FI4000074984 Valmet Oyj Finland 
FR0000073298 Ipsos  France 
FR0010112524 Nexity  France 
GB0001110096 Boot (Henry) United Kingdom 
GB0002018363 Clarkson United Kingdom 
GB0002634946 Bae Systems United Kingdom 
GB0004161021 Hays Plc United Kingdom 
GB0009633180 Dechra Pharmaceuticals United Kingdom 
GB00B05M6465 Numis Corp United Kingdom 
GB00B0LCW083 Hikma Pharmaceuticals United Kingdom 
GB00B1JQDM80 Marston's Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B1ZBKY84 Moneysupermarket.Com Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B63H8491 Rolls-Royce Hldgs Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BF4HYT85 Bank Of Georgia Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BG0TPX62 Funding Circle Holdings Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BG12Y042 Energean Oil & Gas Plc  United Kingdom 
GB00BGLP8L22 Imi United Kingdom 
GB00BJTNFH41 Ao World Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BMSKPJ95 Aa United Kingdom 
GB00BYSS4K11 Georgia Healthcare Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BYYW3C20 Forterra Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BZ1G4322 Melrose Industries United Kingdom 
GB00BZ6STL67 Metro Bank United Kingdom 
GB00BZBX0P70 Gym Group Plc United Kingdom 
GG00B4L84979 Burford Capital Ltd United Kingdom 
IE00BD5B1Y92 Bank Of Cyprus Holdings Public Limited 
Company 
Ireland 
IE00BDQYWQ65 Ishares Ireland 
IT0005331019 Carel Industries Italy 
JE00B2419D89 Breedon Group Plc United Kingdom 
JE00BG6L7297 Boohoo.Com Plc United Kingdom 
NO0010663669 Magseis Norway 
SE0000103699 Hexagon Aktiebolag Sweden 
SE0000163628 Elekta Ab (Publ) Sweden 
SE0005468717 Ferronordic Machines Ab Sweden 
SE0010468116 Arjo Ab B Sweden 
SE0010948588 Bygghemma Group First Registered Sweden 
AT0000KTMI02 Pierer Mobility Ag Austria 
BE0003766806 Ion Beam Applications Sa Iba Belgium 
CH0044781141 Gam Precious Metals - Physical Gold Switzerland 
DE0005103006 Adva Optical Networking Se Germany 
DE0006047004 Heidelbergcement AG Germany 
DK0060027142 ALK-Abello A/S Denmark 
DK0060580512 Nnit  Denmark 
DK0060946788 Ambu Denmark 
ES0177542018 International Airlines Group Spain 
FI0009005870 Konecranes Abp Finland 
FI0009009377 Capman  Finland 
FI0009800643 Yit Oyj Finland 
FI4000312251 Kojamo Oyj Finland 
FR0000050353 Lisi France 
FR0000066672 Gl Events France 
FR0010221234 Eutelsat Communications France 
FR0010908533 Edenred France 
FR0011471135 Erytech Pharma France 
GB0000163088 Speedy Hire United Kingdom 
GB0000904986 Bellway United Kingdom 
GB0004082847 Standard Chartered United Kingdom 
GB0004270301 Hill & Smith Hldgs United Kingdom 
GB0006043169 Morrison(Wm.)Supermarkets United Kingdom 
GB0009465807 Weir Group United Kingdom 
GB0033195214 Kingfisher United Kingdom 
GB00B0HZPV38 Kaz Minerals Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B17BBQ50 Investec Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B17WCR61 Connect Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B4Y7R145 Dixons Carphone Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B7KR2P84 Easyjet United Kingdom 
GB00BJGTLF51 Target Healthcare Reit Plc United Kingdom 
GB00BZ3CNK81 Torm Plc United Kingdom 
IM00B5VQMV65 Gvc Holdings Plc United Kingdom 
IT0000076502 Danieli & C. Officine Meccaniche Spa Italy 
IT0001447348 Mittel  Italy 
IT0003007728 Tod S Spa Italy 
IT0004053440 Datalogic  Italy 
IT0004056880 Amplifon Spa Italy 
JE00BJVNSS43 Ferguson Plc United Kingdom 
LI0315487269 Vpb Vaduz  Liechtenstein 
LU0569974404 Aperam S.A Luxembourg  
NL0000339703 Beter Bed Holding Nv Netherlands 
NL0010733960 Lastminute.Com Netherlands 
NL0011832936 Cosmo Pharmaceuticals N.V. Netherlands 
NO0003053605 Storebrand Asa Norway 
NO0010593544 Insr Insurance Group Norway 
SE0000105199 Haldex  Sweden 
SE0000379497 Semcon  Sweden 
SE0000426546 New Wave Sweden 
SE0006593919 Klovern  Sweden 
SE0009921588 Bilia Sweden 
GB0006640972 4imprint Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB0008085614 Morgan Sindall Group Plc United Kingdom 
GB00B8460Z43 Gcp Student Living United Kingdom 
GB00B1V9NW54 Hilton Food Group Plc United Kingdom 
 
 
